What The following is a piece of the Wikipedia page dedicated to one of the most original thinkers and rebels (not revolutionary, it should be noted) of the story: Max Stirner, whose work "The Ego and Its Own" still fascinates me. In particular, this passage speaks of the political conception of Stirner, individualism and freedom. What do you think of these ideas?
Stirner puts the individual at the center of the world as it already has in itself its absolute: even freedom must be absolute in and of itself, if not, would not be freedom, we should not try to limit it. Needless to say, però, che un siffatto modello di libertà non è praticabile perché la libertà di un individuo non può coincidere con quella di un altro individuo. Sta, comunque, di fatto che la libertà può essere esclusivamente assoluta.
Il problema risiede nel trovare un compromesso tra libertà assoluta (impraticabile) e libertà determinata (che non è autentica libertà). Stirner sceglie la libertà individuale: “si può perdere la libertà, ma la libertà spetta solo a noi”, è una scelta momentanea che si presenta all’individuo in ogni momento della sua vita. L’individuo deve avere la proprietà della libertà, non basta dirsi liberi, io devo poter fare o not do what I desire, no interest in Stirner realize the ideal of freedom, that it points to is to have freedom, became a free man if he can bring freedom to their will (not just the ideal).
Freedom must free the authentic and unique as the individual, freedom so mail is theoretically infinite and without boundaries, individual, and I only I can put it to the limits. Freedom thus understood is expressed outside of any coding, you can be, have, etc.. To take advantage of my freedom I can use every means, even the hypocrisy and deceit. From the point of view of political institutions, there can be no relationship between institutions and individual liberty, the right, just because of it, arises out of my individuality (because it was developed with tools that are outside, in fact, from my individuality ).
rights were granted to me and not the act of my freedom: it is enough to consider something that restrains the freedom I'm not that be my own rights are something that others grant me, it matters little whether this concession is made by few, one or many. They are cut, so the bridges with a political conception ultrademocratica: it is always something of a collective interest in Stirner invece l’individualità.
Una parte importante dell'"Unico e le sue proprieta'" dimostra come non esiste una vera e assoluta "libera concorrenza" in presenza di uno Stato. La libera concorrenza significa "egalité" davanti allo stato; e l'uguaglianza di fronte al "fantasma" di uno Stato dissolve quella che è la concezione stirneriana dell'Unico come differenza assoluta, e non differenza "da". Si concorre sempre e solo con la grazia dello Stato. Lo Stato, in altre parole, concede diritti (tra i quali quello di potere essere in concorrenza) solo per formarsi dei "servi".
Stirner cerca di differenziare più volte la rivoluzione con la rivolta; la rivoluzione è del popolo, mentre la rivolta è del single. This devaluation of the concept of revolution is somehow also designed by Klossowski, the French philosopher. Stirner's The Ego is not just another ghost of Western metaphysics: there is no human essence, a model in which the individual man, the One must adapt or with which it is facing. The only one self-founded.
do not have to fight, according to Stirner, for the "right" to freedom '(print, speech etc. etc...) On this point also agrees Baudrillard in "Symbolic Exchange and Death": Baudrillard points to the deceptive character of those who fight for the right to security. Security per se 'no one cares. And this because 'safety is the extension of industrial death.
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